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We explain the anomaly of election results between large cities and rural areas in terms of
urban scaling in the 1948-2016 US elections and in the 2016 EU referendum of the UK. The
scaling curves are all universal and depend on a single parameter only, and one of the par-
ties always shows superlinear scaling and drives the process, while the sublinear exponent of
the other party is merely the consequence of probability conservation. Based on the recently
developed model of urban scaling, we give a microscopic model of voter behavior in which
we replace diversity characterizing humans in creative aspects with social diversity and tol-
erance. The model can also predict new political developments such as the fragmentation of
the left and ’the immigration paradox’.
Formation of cities is the result of socio-economic advantages of concentrating human popu-
lations in space outpacing associated costs. A variety of disciplines including economics 1–3, geog-
raphy 4, 5, engineering6 and complex systems 7–9 explain the existence of agglomeration or scaling
effects and relate macroscopic properties of a city to its scale (population size). Such relations are
known across the sciences as scaling relations 10, and the systematic study of such relationships in
cities is known as urban scaling. This scale-free, fractal-like behavior has also been observed in
many human social networks 11 including cities 12–15. Using the population N as the measure of
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city size, power law scaling takes the form
Y = Y0 ·Nβ, (1)
where Y can denote material resources such as energy or infrastructure or measures of social ac-
tivity such as wealth, patents and pollution; Y0 is a normalization constant. The exponent β reflects
general dynamic rules at play across the urban system. Most urban socioeconomic indicators have
superlinear β > 1 exponents and as a result, larger cities are disproportionally the centers of inno-
vation and wealth. Sublinear scaling β < 1 characterizes material quantities displaying economies
of scale associated with infrastructure, where the agglomeration into cities pays off in having to
provide fewer roads, shorter cables etc. Thus, material costs related to living in larger cities is
disproportionally low.
Gomez-Lievano, Patterson-Lomba and Hausmann in Ref.16 recently proposed a new model
(GLPLH model) of superlinear scaling and demonstrated its validity on 43 urban phenomena re-
lated to employment, innovation, crime, education and diseases. The model accounts for the differ-
ence in scaling exponents and average prevalence across phenomena as well as for the difference
in the variance within phenomena across cities of similar size. The central idea is that a number
M of necessary complementary factors must simultaneously be present for an urban phenomenon
to occur. The fraction of factors that an individual does not have and is expected to require from
the city in order to be counted into a phenomenon is q ∈ (0, 1), and it quantifies the complexity
of that phenomenon. The fraction of factors that a city provides for an individual is r ∈ (0, 1). It
represents a measure of urban diversity and tends to accumulate logarithmically r = a+ b · logN
with the population size, where a and b has been found to be constant across a wide range of urban
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phenomena. Alternatively, the fraction of factors not present in a city is 1 − r = b · logN0/N ,
where logN0 = (1 − a)/b, and N0 ≈ 1.8 · 1014 is a hypothetical maximal diversity attainable in
a city. Given a city with m factors present, the probability that an individual requires any number
of the m factors that the city has, but none of the M − m factors that the city does not have is
P = (1− q)M−m ≈ eq(M−m) for q  1, and the average number of occurrence of the phenomena
is Y = N〈P 〉N , yielding Y ≈ NeqM(1−r(N)) = NeqMb logN0/N where we used 〈e−qm〉N ≈ e−Mr(N)
and averaging goes for cities of population N . Introducing the the scaling exponent β = 1+Mbq,
this scaling curve then takes the universal form
Y = N0
(
N
N0
)β
, (2)
where N is now the part of population conceivably susceptible to the given urban phenomena.
Scaling laws and universality have been observed in various aspects of the political process
and elections 17–20, but the specific question of urban scaling of election results has not been ad-
dressed before. In the recent presidential elections in the US it has been noticed that votes for
Democrats were disproportionally high in large cities 21, and in the UK major cities also voted to
remain in the EU. Here we show that election data in the US and in the UK show strong evidence
of urban scaling. Using the concept that tolerance and diversity are strongly coupled in cities22, we
develop a microscopic model of voter behavior that produces the macroscopic level urban scaling,
explains the observed single parameter scaling, and describes the distribution of deviations from
the macroscopic curve.
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Figure 1 Urban scaling in the presidential elections in the US. A Doubly logarithmic
plot of votes cast for Republicans (red) and Democrats (blue) as the function of the voter
turnout for the 912 largest Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas in 2016. Best fit
line slopes β and regression coefficients R2 are in the insets. B Scaling exponents for the
Republicans (red) and Democrats (blue) with error-bars for the 18 presidential elections
from 1948 to 2016.
First, we analyze data for the votes cast for the two main political parties in all post-World
War II US presidential elections1 and in the UK EU referendum 6. In Fig. 1A we show votes for the
political options as a function of voter turnout for the 912 largest Metropolitan and Micropolitan
Statistical Areas representing about 82% of the total voter population for the 2016 presidential
election in the US (see supplementary material and methods for the UK). The votes for Democrats
and ’Remain in the EU’ scale superlinearly with exponents βD ≈ 1.14 and βrem ≈ 1.09, while
votes for Republicans and ’Leave the EU’ follow sublinear scaling with βR ≈ 0.92 and βlea ≈ 0.91,
with high regression coefficients R2 ≥ 0.9 indicating robust urban scaling. While the elections
4
took place in two different political situations, nevertheless they show very similar exponents.
In Fig. 1B we show the historical record of scaling exponents of the Democrats βD and of the
Republicans βR for the 18 presidential elections in the period 1948-2016. The exponent of the
Democrats has an increasing, while the exponent of the Republicans a decreasing historical trend.
The Democrat and Republican curves roughly mirror each other in the whole period. The relation
of the two exponents becomes apparent when we plot the Republican exponent as a function of the
Democrat exponent in Fig. 2A.
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Figure 2 Interrelation of the parameters of urban scaling in US elections. A Urban
scaling exponents of Republicans as a function of the Democrats for 18 US presidential
elections from 1948 to 2016 (dots) and the theoretical curve (red line) derived from prob-
ability conservation (5). B Intercepts of the scaling relations log Y0 as a function of the
scaling exponent β for Republicans (red) and Democrats (blue) for presidential elections
in the period 1948-2016. Fitted line (3) with parameters and regression coefficient in the
inset.
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For each election and for each party we can determine the scaling exponent β and the constant
Y0 independently from the fits. In Fig. 2B we plot log Y0 as a function of β. We find a very strong
(R2 = 0.96) linear relation
log Y0 = −αβ + δ, (3)
for both parties and for all elections, with α = 12.111 and δ = 11.396. This indicates that the form
of the scaling relation is independent of the party and election and has the universal form
Y = eδ−αN∗
(
N
N∗
)β
≈ 1
2
N∗
(
N
N∗
)β
, (4)
where N is the voter turnout in a city, β is the exponent of the party and logN∗ = α. The
numerical factor eδ−α is equal to 1/2 within numerical error and the parameter N∗ ≈ 182.000 is
the average turnout of a US city of total population 429.000 in 2016. The remarkable property
of this scaling relation is that on average at turnout N = N∗ the parties share the votes equally
(YD = YR = N∗/2) independent of their exponents βD and βR or of the year of the election and
unaffected by historic changes in population. For cities above turnout N∗ the party with higher β
gets the majority of votes, while below this turnout the party with smaller β succeeds on average.
The observed linear relationship (3) and the single parameter form (4) of the scaling curve is
predicted by the GLPLH model, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it can be adapted to
the election process. Formally, we recover our scaling curve (4) from this theory by identifying
the susceptible population with half of the voter turnout N/2 and by setting N0 = N∗/2. There
are two discrepancies between our scaling curve (4) and that of the GLPLH model. The GLPLH
model is applicable for superlinear β > 1 (Mq > 0) values only, while in case of elections both
superlinear and sublinear exponents arise, and the numerical value of N0,≈ 1.8 ·105 is nine orders
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of magnitude smaller for elections.
The main difference of elections from other urban phenomena is that the scaling curves
influence each other via the competition for votes. This competition is expressed mathematically
by the probability conservation YD/N + YR/N = 1 for the sum of the fraction of votes the parties
get. Using (4) and averaging for all cities yields
1
2
〈
(N/N∗)βD−1
〉
+
1
2
〈
(N/N∗)βR−1
〉
= 1. (5)
This equation guarantees that one of the exponents will be superlinear while the other sublinear
(see supplementary materials and methods). Its numerical solution is shown in Fig. 2A. Thus,
a model and an exponent derived for the results of one of the parties will determine the results
of the other party via probability conservation. The strategy of one of the parties will result in
a superlinear exponent, which can be explained by a adaptation of the GLPLH model, while the
result of the party with the sublinear exponent is just a consequence of the other party’s strategy.
A Scale-Adjusted Metropolitan Indicator25 (SAMI) is the logarithmic deviation of the value
Yi from the average scaling curve for a city with population Ni
ξi = log Yi − log Y0 − β logNi. (6)
The GLPLH model predicts that SAMIs for a given city size range are normally distributed, and
their variance can be expressed with the complexity parameter q and the number of complementary
factors M as σ2SAMI = q
2Mb(logN0 − 〈logN〉), where 〈logN〉 is the mean of the logarithm of
7
city sizes. It can also be expressed with the scaling exponent
σ2SAMI = q(β − 1)(logN0 − 〈logN〉). (7)
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
1
2
3
4
y=0.448x+0.027, R 2 =0.568
0.05 0.1
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
〈log(N)〉 w 
|β-1|〈ξ 2
〉 w/
|β
-1
|
σ ξ  2
 
2016 2012 2008 2004 2000A B
Figure 3 Fluctuations around the average scaling curve. A, Variance of the deviation
from the average scaling curve as a function of the logarithmic city size, measured in voter
turnout. City sizes are binned into 20 windows of uniform sizes on logarithmic scale. In the
inset, standard deviation of SAMIs (6) for all metropolitan areas in our study as a function
β − 1. Best fit line parameters are in the inset. B, Standardized deviation of SAMIs for
the last five US presidential elections. Lower panel: Scatter plot for the Democrat (blue)
and Republican (red) standardized deviations (horizontal axis) and logarithmic city size
(vertical axis). Upper panel: Distribution of the standardized deviations, x axis is shared
with that of the the lower panel. For the Democrats (blue) it is nearly a standard normal
distribution (solid line). For Republicans (red) it is a skewed distribution deviating from the
standard normal distribution (solid line).
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In Fig. 3 we check the general validity of this formula for both parties and for all elections
in the 1948-2016 period. For the variance averaged over all metropolitan areas we can confirm the
proportionality with β − 1 (see inset of Fig. 3A), indicating also that the complexity parameter q
is approximately constant. From the fitted line and from the numerical value 〈logN〉 = 10.55 for
the 2016 election, we get q ≈ 0.28. Then, in the 2000-2016 period for the superlinearly scaling
results of the Democrats, we can make a more detailed calculation for ten windows of city sizes. In
Fig. 3A (main) we can see that curves of σ2SAMI/(β − 1) for different elections in these windows
collapse onto the same curve confirming that the complexity parameter is constant. This implies
that the change of the scaling exponent βD for the Democrats in this period comes solely from the
change of the number of complementary factors M . Deviations of cities from the average scaling
curves can then be standardized in the windows using the window-wise variances. In Fig. 3B we
show the distribution of these standardized SAMIs for both parties. As expected, the distribution
of these standardized SAMIs for Democratic party is standard Gaussian, in agreement with the
GLPLH model. However, the same procedure results in a skewed distribution for the Republicans.
Their distribution is not normal and the GLPLH model doesn’t apply which again confirms that
the two parties don’t have an equal role in the urban scaling.
Now, the question arises: in the context of elections, what are the necessary complementary
factors that must simultaneously be present in order to vote for Democrats in the 1988-2016 period,
where their exponent is superlinear? We found that the complexity parameter q is approximately
constant, so from the 4-6 times growth of βD − 1 in this period we can conclude that the number
of factors M got multiplicated about 4-6 times. The concrete value of M cannot be determined
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from our data, only the product bM that changed from about 0.09 to 0.52 with b being constant. If
we could find these factors, then Republicans (or the Leave campaign) could be characterized as
comprising of those voters, who don’t accept at least one of those M factors. Here, we can just
conjecture based on the agenda of Democrats, that these are ”liberal values” in general, and the
Democrat voter typically accepts all of these values simultaneously. Such values include tolerance
and acceptance towards various social groups ranging from women and blacks at the beginning and
middle of the 20th century to LGBT communities, immigrants, refugees and various other social
minorities recently. In case someone is not able to accept at least one of these, then that person will
probably not vote for the Democrats. That explains why groups of the Republican and the Leave
voters look so heterogeneous: they consist of groups that oppose at least one of these liberal values,
and that are not held together by a common political agenda otherwise. In this context, we can
identify q as a probability that a voter – left on its own devices – rejects one of theM liberal values,
and r(N) is the probability that a city of sizeN makes a voter tolerant towards those values. Social
diversity grows with the city size and voters in cities can face an increasing number of social issues
and can develop tolerance towards them. This is in accordance with ’the immigration paradox’
in Britain, where voters living near immigrants develop a tolerance, while those who do not are
more likely to reject them26. Therefore, we expect that just like other types of diversities in cities,
tolerance grows like r(N) ∼ logN/N0, but the number of maximal social diversity is reached at
N0 ≈ 4 ·105, which is smaller than the diversityN∗ ≈ 1.8 ·1014 observed for the more general type
of diversity, characterizing humans in creative aspects. Finally, there is one more consequence of
this model: as the number of liberal valuesM seems to grow continuously, the potential voters who
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don’t accept one of them also increases, and becomes detrimental for electoral success. This leads
to the fragmentation of the political left, since a larger number of smaller parties accepting only
a subset of the M values, or even ”single-issue” parties can minimize the number of estranged
voters and maximize the aggregated votes of all these parties. We believe that he model and
the calculations could further be extended to metropolitan areas in other countries or to electoral
systems with multiple choices.
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Supplementary Materials and Methods
1 Data sources
We downloaded county-level historical US presidential election datasets from 1. We calculated the
total number of votes for the Democratic and Republican Party and the turnouts for all Metropolitan
and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 2 by matching MSA’s to the county level data 3.
As for the UK, we downloaded electorate-level number of votes for Remain and Leave from
the EU referendum result dataset 4. We filtered the UK electorates based on whether they have
a city in their core 5, because the resolution of the data available about the referendum was not
enough to consider using cities as units.
2 Data fit
For each year y, we assume that the expected value of the number of voters for a party (D, Demo-
crat or R, Republican) scales with the size of a city in the following way:
Y (y)(N) = Y
(y)
0,D/R ·Nβ
(y)
D/R .
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we can fit a line using OLS fit on the (log Y,N) pairs for
each election for both parties (we leave the year and party notations for simplicity reasons):
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log(Y (N)) = log(Y0) + β · log(N),
where the β denotes the slope, log Y0 the the intercept of the fitted line, thus β is the exponent
of the party in year y.
3 Pivotal point
If we assume that the intercept log(Y0) is a function of β that changes slowly with β, and we know
that β is always close to 1, then we can approximate log Y0 around 1 linearly:
log(Y0(β)) ≈ log(Y0(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ−α
+(β − 1) ∂ log(Y0(β))
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−α
+ · · · = −α · β + δ
In the case of β = 1, it has to be true, that
Y0(1) = e
δ−α = 〈p〉 = p0,
the city-averaged voter fractions, because that would mean that every city votes as if all voters
were dispersed homogeneously:
YD(N) = p0N.
Let α = logN∗, then p0 = eδ/eα = eδ/N∗.
log(Y0(β)) = − logN∗ · β + log(p0) + logN∗
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By substituting it into the original scaling relation:
log Y (N) = log(p0N
∗)− β · logN∗ + β · logN
thus,
Y (N) = p0N
∗
(
N
N∗
)β
= p0N
(
N
N∗
)β−1
This implies that all fitted lines have to go through the (N∗, p0N∗) point, because atN = N∗,
Y equals to p0N∗ regardless of the value of β. Also note, that N∗ is universal for both parties and
for all elections. Thus, the scaling relations only have only parameter, the scaling exponent β.
4 Exponent relationship
In a given year, for every city i it holds that the number of Democrat and Republican voters is
approximately equal to the turnout in the city:
Y
(i)
D
N (i)
+
Y
(i)
R
N (i)
= 1
Assuming scaling, the expected values of the Democrat and Republican voters can be sub-
stituted:
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Y
(i)
D =
1
2
N∗
(
N (i)
N∗
)βD
=
1
2
N (i)
(
N (i)
N∗
)βD−1
Y
(i)
R =
1
2
N∗
(
N (i)
N∗
)βR
=
1
2
N (i)
(
N (i)
N∗
)βR−1
Thus,
1
2
(
N (i)
N∗
)βD−1
+
1
2
(
N (i)
N∗
)βR−1
= 1(
N (i)
N∗
)βD−1
+
(
N (i)
N∗
)βR−1
= 2
Because the exponents βD and βR are close to 1, the left hand side can be approximated to
the second order
1 + (βD − 1) · log N
(i)
N∗
+
1
2
(βD − 1)2 ·
(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2
+ · · ·+
1 + (βR − 1) · log N
(i)
N∗
+
1
2
(βR − 1)2 ·
(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2
+ · · · = 2
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Let us average the equation over all cities in a year:
(βD − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
+
1
2
(βD − 1)2 ·
〈(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2〉
+
(βR − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
+
1
2
(βR − 1)2 ·
〈(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2〉
= 0
In the first order, βR − 1 = −(βD − 1). Because the term (βR − 1)2 is small, we only use its
first order approximation, thus:
(βD − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
+
1
2
(βD − 1)2 ·
〈(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2〉
+
(βR − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
+
1
2
(−(βD − 1))2 ·
〈(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2〉
= 0
(βD − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
+ (βD − 1)2 ·
〈(
log
N (i)
N∗
)2〉
+ (βR − 1) ·
〈
log
N (i)
N∗
〉
= 0
βR − 1 = −(βD − 1) ·+(βD − 1)2 ·
〈(
log N
(i)
N∗
)2〉
〈
log N
(i)
N∗
〉
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5 EU referendum UK 2016
Similarly to that of the presidential election dataset in the United States, we fitted the Y = Y0 ·Nβ
function on the number of Remain and Leave votes for the EU referendum in the cities of the United
Kingdom. Electorate-level data was obtained from the homepage of the Electoral Commission 6.
Since we did not have a city-level resolution, we took electorates that were centered around a city,
and used only their turnouts as N , and number of voters as Y .
Because the distribution of city sizes in the UK is very uneven even on the logarithmic scale
with London being disproportionally large, we weighted the points by 1/N in the OLS fit on the
double logarithmic plot.
As in the case of the US Democrats, the Remain votes showed a strong superlinear scaling
with βRemain = 1.08, while the Leave votes scale sublinearly βLeave = 0.91
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Figure 4 Urban scaling in the EU referendum results in the UK. Doubly logarithmic plot
of votes cast for Leave (red) and Remain (blue) as the function of the voter turnout for the
electorates surrounding cities. Best fit line slopes β and regression coefficients R2 are in
the insets.
The results suggest that a similar mechanism can be behind this phenomenon, as behing the
Democrat voters in the US.
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